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Abstract  
 
This article will evaluate whether, and to what extent, preventive measures in the fight 
against money laundering may limit fundamental freedoms and human rights within the 
European Union (“EU”). It will analyze two judgments rendered by the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) and one judgment rendered by the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”). In these three cases, the courts were asked to investigate the compatibility of 
specific Anti-Money Laundering (“AML”) preventive measures with the freedom to provide 
services enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and 
human rights. Considering the gravity of the phenomenon, AML measures have gradually 
emerged as a “European general interest.” The Fourth EU Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive, which has been recently adopted, displays this compelling need.  
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A. Introduction 
 
As it is well known, banks existed in Greek and Roman times, though people began to use 
the word bancus in the Middle Ages to identify the bench on which a professional banker 
used to display and exchange the money.
1
 Notwithstanding the ancient origins of banks, 
money laundering has flourished as a crime more recently.
2
 Criminalization of money 
laundering began in late twentieth century, when states realized that the process of 
making illegally gained proceeds—“dirty money”—appear legal could severely affect 
economies. Nonetheless, until the 1970s, “there was no emphasis on the illegal earnings 
from crime, at least not as an autonomous concept, since it was viewed only as an 
accessory.”
3
 The term “money laundering” was first used in the mid-1970s by U.S. law 
enforcement officials,
4
 and a U.S. District Court first introduced this wording in a judgment 
in 1982.
5
 Money laundering became a federal crime with the enactment of the 1986 U.S. 
Money Laundering Control Act.
6
 At the regional level, the Council of Europe adopted the 
Recommendation no. 80 (10) on measures against the transfer and the safekeeping of 
funds of criminal origin in 1980. The Council acknowledged that: 
 
the transfer of funds of criminal origin from one country 
to another and the process by which they are laundered 
through insertion in the economic system give rise to 
serious problems, encourage the perpetration of further 
criminal act and this course the phenomenon to spread 
nationally and internationally.
7
  
                                            
1 Robert S. Lopez, The Dawn of Modern Banking, in THE DAWN OF MODERN BANKING 1, 1 (R.S. Lopez et al. eds., 
1979); see also ALESSANDRO MARZO MAGNO, L’INVENZIONE DEI SOLDI, QUANDO LA FINANZA PARLAVA ITALIANO 45 (2013).  
2 For the origins of money laundering, see GUY STESSENS, MONEY LAUNDERING: A NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MODEL (2000). See also EDWIN TRUMAN & PETER REUTER, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: PROGRESS ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING 
(2004); BILL GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY (2011); Brigitte Unger, Money Laundering Regulation: From Al Capone to Al 
Qaeda, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 19 (2013); IL RICICLAGGIO COME FENOMENO TRANSNAZIONALE: 
NORMATIVE A CONFRONTO (R. Razzante ed., 2014).  
3 John Vervaele, Economic Crimes and Money Laundering: A New Paradigm for the Criminal Justice System?, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 379, 382 (Brigitte Unger & Daan Van Der Linde eds., 2013).  
4 Money laundering was linked to drug trafficking. ROBERT E. GROSSE, DRUGS AND MONEY: LAUNDERING LATIN AMERICA’S 
COCAINE DOLLARS 69 (2001).  
5 U.S. v. Four Million Two Hundred & Fifty-Five Thousand, 551 F. Supp. 314, 325 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also GILMORE, 
supra note 2, at 22.  
6 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–579, 100 Stat. 3207–18–21 (1986) (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2006)); see also Vervaele, supra note 3, at 383.   
7 Recommendation No. R (80) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures Against the 
Transfer and the Safekeeping of Funds of Criminal Origin, 1980 EUR. Y.B. 1. A thorough analysis of the first 
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In 1989, the then G7 became aware of the fact that illegal narcotics trafficking had 
become “a problem of alarming proportions and world-wide concern” and established the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (“FATF”).
8
 These initial steps 
demonstrate the increasing awareness of the effects of globalization of finance, a 
phenomenon that presents two conflicting views. On the one hand, globalization has 
spurred investments and movement of capital across borders, positively affecting the 
worldwide economy. On the other hand, globalization has created a fertile ground for 
criminal activities, with money laundering being the “natural” consequence of predicate 
offences, such as drug trafficking, fraud, corruption, and terrorist financing. Over the 
years, the impression of money laundering constituting a threat to the economy and 
societies has determined increasing action at the international, regional, and national 
level.  
 
This article will evaluate whether, and to what extent, preventive measures in the fight 
against money laundering may limit EU fundamental freedoms and human rights. Criminal 
law often requires the restriction of individual fundamental freedoms to pursue more 
general purposes. The issue is how to set the “correct balance” between the fight against 
transnational crimes and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
analysis will focus on two judgments rendered by the ECJ, respectively in Ordre des 
Barreaux and Jyske Bank Gibraltar, and the judgment rendered by the ECtHR in the 
Michaud v. France. European courts were asked to investigate the compatibility of specific 
AML preventive measures with human rights and the freedom to provide services 
enshrined in the TFEU. This article will contend that anti-money laundering measures have 
gradually emerged as a “European general interest.” The compelling need in Europe to 
fight against this “invisible crime,” having a multitude of indirect effects—such as the 
distortion of consumption and investments
9
—is confirmed by the recently adopted Fourth 
EU AML Directive (“4AML Directive”).
10
 
 
                                                                                                                
instruments related to anti-money laundering are described in VALSAMIS MITSILEGAS, MONEY LAUNDERING COUNTER-
MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 44 (2003), and in GILMORE, supra note 2.  
8 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Report on the Extent and Nature of the Money Laundering 
Process and FATF Recommendations to Combat Money Laundering (1990), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/1990%20ENG.pdf. 
9 Joras Ferwenda, The Effects of Money Laundering, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 35 (Brigitte Unger 
& Daan Van Der Linde eds., 2013).   
10 Directive 2015/849, On the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purposes of Money 
Laundering or Terrorist Financing, amending Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 
2006/70, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 73.  
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B. AML as a Restriction of EU Fundamental Freedoms: The Jyske Bank Gibraltar Case 
Before the ECJ (2013)
11
  
 
The ECJ has used a “restrictive” approach when analyzing the compatibility of national 
measures with the four freedoms enshrined in the Treaties.
12
 In the absence of 
harmonization at EU level, Member States may adopt national measures restricting the 
free movement of goods, persons, capital, and establishment, as well as the freedom to 
provide services, provided that these measures “serve important interests recognized by 
the Union as valuable,” they are proportionate, and they do not constitute a means of 
arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States.
13
 
Hence, the Court posited as early as 1979 that in the absence of common rules relating to 
the production and marketing of a certain product, Member States are free to regulate all 
matters related to the production and the marketing of that product on their territory.
14
  
Nevertheless, the Court further explained: 
 
[O]bstacles to movement within the Community resulting 
from disparities between the national laws relating to 
the marketing of the products in question must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized 
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory 
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the 
fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of 
the consumer.
15
  
 
National measures, therefore, must serve a “purpose which is in the general interest”
16
 
and be recognized as necessary and proportionate. 
 
                                            
11 Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administración del Estado (Apr. 25, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/. 
12 Free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, which are the bases of the EU internal market. See 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 26, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 
115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
13 CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU 155 (2013).  
14 Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 
649; see also GIUSEPPE TESAURO, DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 409 (2012); LUIGI DANIELE, DIRITTO DEL MERCATO UNICO 
EUROPEO 68 (2012).  
15 Cassis de Dijon, Case C-120/78 at para. 8. 
16 Id. at para. 14.  
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To demonstrate the “restrictive approach” of the ECJ, we may refer to one further 
example: the jurisprudence related to the so-called “golden shares” or “special rights,” 
which implicates both the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.
17
 
In a judgment concerning special rights maintained for the Portuguese State and for other 
public entities or public sector bodies in GALP Energia SGPS SA, the ECJ affirmed that: 
 
[I]t is common ground that requirements of public 
security must, in particular as a derogation from the 
fundamental principle of the free movement of capital, 
be interpreted strictly, with the result that their scope 
cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State 
without any control by the institutions of the European 
Union. Thus, public security may be relied on only if 
there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society.
18
 
 
Regarding anti-money laundering policies, on 25 April 2013, the Court decided a landmark 
case in its preliminary ruling in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, addressing the implementation of the 
Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“3AML Directive”) in Spain.
19
 Jyske Bank was a 
branch of the Danish Jyske Bank established in Gibraltar, which operated in Spain under 
the rules governing the freedom to provide services. Article 22, paragraph 2 of the 3AML 
Directive provides that information on suspicious transactions shall be forwarded to the 
“financial intelligence unit of the Member State in whose territory the institution or 
person forwarding the information is situated.”
20
 States must establish a financial 
intelligence unit (“FIU”) to receive, analyze and disseminate to the competent authorities 
“disclosures of information which concern potential money laundering, potential terrorist 
financing or are required by national legislation or regulation.”
21
 According to Spanish law, 
credit institutions operating in Spain must inform the Spanish FIU of transfers of more 
than 30,000 euro to or from tax havens and uncooperative territories, such as Gibraltar.
22
 
                                            
17 For a comprehensive study, see DANIELE GALLO, I SERVIZI DI INTERESSE ECONOMICO GENERALE (2010); COMPANY LAW AND 
ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM: NEW CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2010) and 
bibliography cited.  
18 Case C-212/09, Comm’n v. Portugal, 2011 E.C.R. I-10889 (emphasis added).  
19 Directive 2005/60/EC on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, 2005 O.J. (L 309) 15 [hereinafter 3AML Directive]. 
20 Id. at art. 22, para. 2.  
21 Id. at art. 21. 
22 Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd., Case C-212/11 at para. 20. Territories regarded as tax havens and uncooperative 
territories were specified by Royal Decree 1080/1991 of 5 July 1991 (BOE No 167, of 13 July 1991, p. 233371), 
and by order ECO/2652/2002 of 24 October 2002 on the implementation of disclosure obligations in relation to 
operations with certain States to the Servicio Ejecutivo of the Commission for the prevention of money 
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Jyske bank only partially complied with the request forwarded by the Spanish FIU, invoking 
the banking secrecy in force in Gibraltar, resulting in a fine of 1,700,000 euro. The bank 
appealed against the decision before the Spanish Supreme Court, which referred the case 
to the ECJ. The analysis of the European judges was twofold. They first interpreted Article 
22 of the 3AML Directive and then Article 56 TFEU, even though the domestic court did 
not refer to the latter provision in its question.
23
  
 
I. Article 22 of the Third AML Directive 
 
The 3AML Directive was adopted to transpose into the EU legal system the FATF 
recommendations on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism revised 
in 2003.
24
 It applies to the operators listed in Article 2—not only credit and financial 
institutions, but also legal and professional persons such as auditors, notaries and legal 
professionals acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate 
transaction, trusts, real estate agents, natural or legal persons when payments are made 
in cash in an amount of 15,000 euro or more, casinos—and contains provisions on 
customer due diligence, reporting obligations, record keeping, and enforcement 
measures.
25
 
 
Focusing on the case under review, the text of Article 22 of the 3AML Directive is quite 
clear. The Court explained that it must be interpreted:   
 
as meaning that the entities referred to must forward the 
requested information to the FIU of the Member State in 
whose territory they are situated, that is to say, in the 
case of operations performed under the rules on the 
                                                                                                                
laundering and monetary offences (Orden ECO/2652/2002 por la que se desarrollan las obligaciones de 
comunicación de operaciones en relación con determinados países al Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de 
Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias) (BOE No 260 of 30 October 2002, p. 38033). 
Gibraltar appears on this list. 
23 Id. at para. 38.  
24 See 3AML Directive, supra note 19, Preamble, recital no. 5 (“Since the FATF Forty Recommendations were 
substantially revised and expanded in 2003, Directive should be in line with that new international standard.”); 
see also SARA DE VIDO, IL CONTRASTO DEL FINANZIAMENTO AL TERRORISMO INTERNAZIONALE. PROFILI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
E DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 172 (2012).  
25 The article is not aimed at a deep analysis of the Directive. For further details, see GILMORE, supra note 2, at 
236; Valsamis Mitsilegas & Bill Gilmore, The EU Legislative Framework Against Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Finance: A Critical Analysis in the Light of Evolving Global Standards 56 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 119 (2007); Lucia Dalla 
Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro, The Risk-Based Approach in the New European Anti-Money Laundering 
Legislation: A Law and Economics View, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 931 (2009); Italo Borrello, Il ruolo dell’Unione europea 
nel controllo dei capitali di provenienza illecita, in IL RICICLAGGIO COME FENOMENO TRANSNAZIONALE: NORMATIVE A 
CONFRONTO 159 (Ranieri Ruzzante ed., 2014).   
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freedom to provide services, to the FIU of the Member 
State of origin.
26
  
 
Nevertheless, the Court pushed the boundaries of the provision by concluding that Article 
22 “does not expressly prohibit” the host Member State from requiring a credit institution 
carrying out activities in its territory under the rules on the freedom to provide services to 
forward the information referred directly to its own FIU “in so far as such legislation seeks 
to strengthen . . . the effectiveness of the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing.”
27
 According to the judges, credit institutions remain nonetheless obliged to 
supply the required information to the FIU of the home state, which are in turn asked to 
cooperate with FIUs situated in other EU countries.
28
  
 
The Court could have interpreted the word “situated” in a broader sense to include 
situations in which a bank operates through agents and not through a branch.
29
 As an 
alternative, European judges could have drawn on Article 5 of the Directive, which allows 
States to “adopt or retain in force stricter provisions in the field covered by this Directive 
to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing.”
30
 The measures adopted by Spain 
may be covered by this provision in so far they are aimed to apply to credit institutions 
situated in a country whose AML policies show severe weaknesses. As the Advocate 
General argued, the control by the FIU of the host State could prevent situations in which 
“a credit institution opts for the freedom to provide services regime in order to circumvent 
the more stringent supervision exercised by the host Member State and so opens a 
registered office or branch in a Member State where supervision is perhaps less 
stringent.”
31
  
 
II. Article 56 TFEU  
 
According to Article 56 of the TFEU, restrictions on the “freedom to provide services” 
within the Union are prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are 
established in a State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
32
 
                                            
26 Jyske Bank, Case 212/11 at para. 43. 
27 Id. at paras. 45, 49.  
28 Id. at paras. 51, 54.  
29 In this sense, see the Opinion of Advocate General Bot at paras. 95–96, Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank of Gibraltar 
Ltd. v. Administración del Estado (Oct. 4, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/. 
30 Id. at para. 6. 
31 Id. at para. 85.  
32 TESAURO, supra note 14, at 541.  
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In the case Jyske Bank Gibraltar, the ECJ affirmed that a national measure such as the one 
adopted by Spain constitutes a restriction on the aforementioned freedom when it implies 
costs and is additional to the controls already conducted in the Member State where the 
institution at issue is situated.
33
 After assessing that there was a restriction on one of the 
freedoms granted by the Treaty, the Court answered two main questions: Whether 
national legislation was justified by an “overriding requirement relating to the public 
interest,” and whether the same legislation was “appropriate for securing the attainment 
of the aim which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain 
it.”
34
 As for the first question, the ECJ affirmed that the prevention and the combating of 
money laundering and terrorist financing are “legitimate aims.”
35
 AML as a public interest 
had already emerged in a previous judgment concerning gambling services in France.
36
 
Accordingly, the ECJ includes in the “mandatory” or “public interest” requirements issues 
like the fight against crime and the prevention of fraud.
37
  
 
The ECJ then assessed the suitability of national legislation for attaining the aims it 
pursues. The answer was positive. On the one hand, domestic legislation, such as the 
Spanish one, enables the Member State concerned to require at any time, “where there is 
reasonable doubt as to the legality of a financial transaction,” information necessary to 
pursue and punish alleged perpetrators of the crime.
38
 On the other hand, it is appropriate 
and non-discriminatory as all operators are subject to similar obligations.
39
  
 
The Court finally examined national legislation according to the principle of 
proportionality.
40
 The Court explained that the mechanism for cooperation between FIUs 
                                            
33 Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd., Case C-212/11 at para. 59. 
34 Id. at para. 60.  
35 Id. at para. 62.  
36 Case 212/08, Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre, 2011 E.C.R. I-5633, paras. 45–46.  
37 BARNARD, supra note 13, at 173.  
38 Jyske Bank, Case 212/11 at paras. 65–66. 
39 Id. 
40 On the principle of proportionality, see, e.g., Gráinne De Burca, The Principle of Proportionality and Its 
Application in EC Law, 13 Y.B. EURO. L. 105 (1993); Christian Tomuschat, Le Principe de Proportionnalité: Quis 
Judicabit?, 13 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 97 (1997); ENZO CANNIZZARO, IL PRINCIPIO DELLA PROPORZIONALITÀ 
NELL’ORDINAMENTO INTERNAZIONALE (2000); Jan H. Jans, Proportionality Revisited, 27 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 
239 (2000); Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 EURO. L.J. 158 (2010); 
Marco Pertile, Il Principio di Proporzionalità nell’Interazione tra Diritto Umanitario e Tutela dei Diritti Umani: 
Strumento per la Risoluzione delle Antinomie o mero Argomento Retorico?, in LA TUTELA DEI DIRITTI UMANI E IL 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 159 (2012); Vassilis Hatzopoulos, The Court’s Approach to Services (2006–2012): From Case 
Law to Case Load?, 50 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 459 (2013). 
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presents some deficiencies that prevent authorities from acting in short time.
41
 As a 
consequence, proportionality is respected to the extent that national legislation requires  
 
credit institutions situated in another Member State to 
forward, concerning operations carried out under the 
freedom to provide services, information necessary for 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing 
directly to the FIU of the host Member State, only where 
there is no effective mechanism ensuring full and 
complete cooperation between the FIUs and allowing 
money laundering and terrorist financing to be combated 
just as effectively.
42
  
 
At least for the time being, FIUs are not obliged to automatically forward information to 
the FIUs of another Member State. Furthermore, inasmuch as Spanish legislation was 
limited to operations exceeding 30,000 euro and involving transfers of funds from or 
towards certain territories, it does not appear to be disproportionate.
43
  
 
III. The Priority Given to AML Over EU Freedoms  
 
When it comes to analyzing alleged violations of fundamental freedoms, the focus is 
usually on domestic measures which may, or actually do, affect EU freedoms. In Jyske 
Bank, Spain did not intervene in the proceeding in order to justify its measures, but it tried 
to have a decision of inadmissibility from the ECJ, arguing that the question presented by 
the Spanish judge was “purely hypothetical.”
44
 Accordingly, the State did not present 
arguments on the “national interest” pursued by domestic law. On the merits, the ECJ 
mainly referred to the fact that national legislation was aimed to effectively combat 
money laundering, hence a much more general objective, the one enshrined in the 3AML 
Directive. In Jyske Bank, the “overriding reason” does not seem to be merely the one of an 
EU Member State, but also—or mainly—an objective of the entire Union. Borrowing the 
reasoning of an author in another context, the Court did not see AML as constituting “the 
express public-policy derogation.”
45
 It saw AML as a free-standing public interest or 
overriding requirement. This essential interest has gained such momentum in the EU that 
                                            
41 Case C-212/11, Jyske Bank Gibraltar Ltd. v. Administración del Estado, paras. 73–75 (Apr. 25, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/. 
42 Id. at para. 81.  
43 Id. at para. 83.  
44 Id. at para. 32. 
45 Referring to fundamental rights, see BARNARD, supra note 13, at 159.  
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the Court did not analyze the possibility of a less restrictive alternative. The host state’s 
action is usually justified, in the field of services, where it takes into account the actions 
taken by the home state to protect a particular interest. The failure by the host state to 
consider supervision already carried out in the home state “means that the national 
measure fails the test of proportionality.”
46
 For example, the Court could have asked the 
national judge to assess whether the FIU of the host state actually sought to cooperate 
with the Gibraltar one. To the contrary, the Court assessed the general system of 
cooperation between FIUs, shifting to a certain extent the focus from the national system 
to the system within the European Union.  
 
Despite the Court’s reasoning, Article 22 of the 3AML Directive needs further clarification. 
The new 4AML Directive includes an entire subsection on “Cooperation between FIUs and 
with the Commission.”
47
 It does not appear, however, to overcome the differences 
between EU Member States’ legislation regarding FIUs. The Commission “may” lend 
assistance to facilitate coordination between FIUs within the Union.
48
 Therefore, the EU 
institution could play an important role to reinforce cooperation and define guidelines for 
national authorities. As outlined by a commentator, even though practice shows that the 
closest authority to the activity at risk should be competent, this acknowledgment does 
not fill the lacunae in the level of cooperation among EU FIUs.
49
  
 
One more consideration may be drawn from the case at issue. Some ECJ judgments are 
based on a balance of interests, opposing the “national objective with the EU (free 
movement) objective,” in an analysis of the principle of proportionality stricto sensu.
50
 
One of the interests prevails. In the case under examination, the balance of interests 
appears to be between two “European” interests: The effective fight against money 
laundering and the freedom to provide services. Contrary to previous judgments related to 
national legislation concerning gambling—in which the Court has applied “a very relaxing” 
and “laissez faire” approach relying on the determination of the level of protection 
provided by the Member States,
51
 and differing from other judgments in which the Court 
strictly interpreted the limitations to EU freedoms
52
—in the case at issue, the Court 
                                            
46 Id. at 391. 
47 Directive 2015/849, supra note 10, at arts. 51–57. 
48 Id. at art. 51. 
49 Arnaud Lecocq, Le Blanchiment des Capitaux, 6 J. DROIT EUR. 233 (2013).  
50 Hatzopoulos, supra note 40, at 497; see also FRIEDL WEISS & CLEMENS KAUPA, EUROPEAN UNION INTERNAL MARKET LAW 
34 (2014).  
51 Hatzopoulos, supra note 40, at 499; WEISS & KAUPA, supra note 50, at 264.  
52 See TESAURO, supra note 14, at 562 (concerning the freedom to provide services and indistinctly applicable 
measures, the ECJ has stressed the “exceptional character” of the derogations).  
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attempted to strike the right balance between two European interests. European judges 
afforded priority to AML policies, which, in the absence of complete harmonization, are 
clearly achieved at the national level, but also aimed to realize a “supranational” interest. 
This “supranational” European interest also emerges when AML is pitted against human 
rights issues.  
 
C. May AML Policies Limit Human Rights? 
 
European courts have also investigated whether AML measures may constitute a 
legitimate restriction on human rights. The two judgments analyzed in the following 
paragraphs, rendered respectively by the ECJ and the ECtHR,  dealt with the same issue—
that is, the obligations lawyers and legal professionals must abide by in order to combat 
money laundering. These obligations derive from national legislation transposing EU law, 
which in turn is in conformity with the FATF Recommendations adopted at the 
international level. The two courts use different perspectives in these cases. In the first 
judgment this article will focus on, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone,
53
 
the ECJ analyzed the compatibility of a specific provision of a former version of the AML 
Directive with the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”). The prospective clients of legal professionals were considered to 
be entitled to such right. In the second judgment under analysis, Michaud v. France, the 
ECtHR examined the compatibility of a measure imposing reporting obligations on lawyers 
with the right of the lawyer—and not of the client—with the respect for his/her 
correspondence enshrined in Article 8 ECHR.  
 
I. Ordre des Barreaux  
 
This case concerns the First AML Directive (“1AML Directive”),
54
 as amended by the 
Second AML Directive (“2AML Directive”),
55
 which provided for a wider scope of 
application—including among the addressees, notaries, and legal professionals.
56
 The 
Belgian legislator transposed the 1AML Directive as amended, including Articles 2(a)(5) 
and 6, according to which the Directive is applicable to notaries and other independent 
                                            
53 Case 305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5305. 
54 Council Directive 91/308, June 10, 1991, On Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of 
Money Laundering, 1991 O.J. (L 166) 77 [hereinafter 1AML Directive]. 
55 Directive 2001/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Dec. 4, 2001, amending Council Directive 
91/308 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, 2001 O.J. (L 344) 
76 (EC) [hereinafter 2AML Directive].  
56 Id. art. 2(a), para. 5. See Jan Komárek, Legal Professional Privilege and the EU’s Fight Against Money 
Laundering, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 13, 15 (2009); Michiel Luchtman & Rob Van der Hoeven, Case C–305/05, Ordre des 
Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone et al. v. Conseil des Ministres, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 
June 2007, Grand Chamber; [2007] ECRI-5305, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 301 (2009).  
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legal professionals when they assist clients in commercial or financial activities.
57
 The bar 
associations argued before the Belgian Constitutional Court that the domestic provisions 
were in breach of several rights, including but not limited to Article 6 ECHR, because they 
affected the legal privilege present in the lawyer-client relationship. The Court decided to 
request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ regarding whether the said articles of the 
Directive infringed the right to a fair trial as enshrined in the ECHR. Other rights mentioned 
by the parties were not taken into account by the referring Court. 
 
The ECJ confirmed the legality of the contested articles of the Directive for two main 
reasons. First, lawyers are subject to the obligations of information and cooperation in 
certain transactions “listed exhaustively.” Second, there is a clear exemption in Article 6, 
paragraph 3 of the 1 AML Directive as amended: 
 
It would not be appropriate for Directive 91/308 to 
impose the obligation of reporting suspicions of money 
laundering on independent members of professions 
providing legal advice which are legally recognized and 
controlled, such as lawyers, where they are ascertaining 
the legal position of a client or representing a client in 
legal proceedings.
58
  
 
Acknowledging a certain ambiguity in the text of this article, the ECJ posited that 
preference should be given “to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent 
with the EC Treaty” and that national law must be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
Community law and fundamental rights.
59
 Referring to Article 6 ECHR, the Court 
emphasized that reporting obligations are limited to activities that take place “in a context 
with no link to judicial proceedings and, consequently, those activities fall outside the 
                                            
57 See 2AML Directive, supra note 55, art. 2(a), para. 5  
Member States shall ensure that the obligations laiddown in this 
Directive are imposed on the following institutions: . . . 5. notaries and 
other independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether: 
(a) By assisting in the planning or execution of transactions for their 
client concerning the (i) buying and selling of real property or business 
entities; (ii) managing of client money, securities or other assets; (iii) 
opening or management of bank, savings or securities accounts; (iv) 
organization of contributions necessary for the creation, operation or 
management of companies; (v) creation, operation or management of 
trusts, companies or similar structures; (b) or by acting on behalf of and 
for their client in any financial or real estate transaction. 
58 Case 305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et Germanophone v. Conseil des Ministres, 2007 E.C.R. I-5305, 
para. 24. 
59 Id. at para. 28.  
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scope of the right to a fair trial.”
60
 According to the judges, the exemptions concerning 
assistance in defending the client, representation before the courts and advice as to the 
manner of instituting or avoiding judicial proceedings, safeguard the right of the client to a 
fair trial.
61
  
 
Although not expressly stated by the Court, AML policies have emerged as a general 
interest, which might, in specific circumstances, limit legal privilege. Advocate General 
Poiares Maduro more clearly posited that “the objective of combating money laundering 
may be regarded as an objective of general interest.”
62
 Some commentators correctly 
observe that there is a “tension” between effectiveness in the fight against money 
laundering and the protection of human rights (legal privilege),
63
 and it is difficult to 
distinguish between what is related to a trial and what it falls outside its scope.
64
 
Nevertheless, the importance of the judgment should not be underestimated. Lawyers, 
notaries, and other professionals could play a key role in the fight against transnational 
criminality, as they may be asked, for example, to prepare real estate sales contracts or 
handle mergers, acquisitions, and share exchanges which may hide money laundering 
operations.
65
 “Good governance requires a proper balance with . . . other values,” 
indeed.
66
 The proper balance must be defined by national judges, due to the lack of a 
common European definition of the expression “ascertain the legal position of a client.”
67
 
Hence, in 2008, the Belgian Constitutional Court that referred the preliminary question to 
the ECJ dismissed the appeal presented by bar associations claiming the violations of their 
rights, but it pronounced at the same time what follows:
68
 
 
                                            
60 Id. at para. 33.  
61 Id. at para. 34.  
62 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro at para. 78, Case C-305/05, Ordre des Barreaux Francophones et 
Germanophone v. Conseil des Ministres (Dec. 14, 2006), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-305/05&td=ALL.  
63 Melissa Van Den Broek & Henk Addink, Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing from a Good 
Governance Perspective, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING 368, 374 (Brigitte Unger & Daan Van Der 
Linde eds., 2013). 
64 Id. at 313.  
65 The real estate sector is particularly vulnerable to money laundering. See Joras Ferwenda & Brigitte Unger, 
Detecting Money Laundering in the Real Estate Sector, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING, supra note 64, 
at 269. 
66 Van Den Broek & Addink, supra note 63, at 375. 
67 Maaike Stouten & André Tilleman, Reporting Duty for Lawyers vs. Legal Privilege—Unresolved Tension, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MONEY LAUNDERING supra note 2, at 431.  
68 Cour constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 10-2008, Jan. 23, 2008 (Fr.). 
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The information of which the lawyer [becomes] aware 
during the exercise of the essential activities of his or her 
profession, including . . . the defense or representation in 
court of the client and the provision of legal advice, even 
outside the context of judicial proceedings, 
remain . . .  covered by professional secrecy and [cannot] 
therefore be drawn to the attention of the authorities.  
 
To the contrary, when a lawyer exercises an activity that goes “beyond his or her specific 
role of defense or representation in court and the provision of legal advice,” he or she 
“could be subject to the obligation to communicate to the authorities the information of 
which he or she [is] aware.” The broad interpretation given by the Belgian Court to the 
wording “ascertain the legal position” was confirmed by a judgment rendered by the 
French Conseil d’Etat in April 2008. In that case, the Conseil d’Etat determined that the 
activity of giving legal advice to a client should be exempted from reporting obligations, 
provided that it is aimed at the defense or representation of the same client in court. 
Pursuing “l’intérêt général” (the “general interest”) of the fight against money laundering, 
however, lawyers are not exempt from reporting suspicious transactions whenever legal 
advice is given for the purposes of committing a crime.
69
 French judges concluded that the 
domestic legislation correctly transposed the 2AML Directive, and the latter, under the 
interpretation given by the Conseil d’Etat, does not breach human rights. If we consider 
that national judges have a margin of appreciation in defining the boundaries of 
“ascertaining the legal position,” it seems clear that “harmonization [clearly] fails.”
70
 
 
II. Michaud v. France  
 
This case decided by the ECJ in 2007 had a sort of “sequel” before the ECtHR. As a matter 
of fact, the ECJ did not evaluate the compatibility of the AML Directive—at that time, the 
1AML Directive as amended by the 2AML Directive—with the right to respect for private 
and family life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR. In its opinion in Ordre des barreaux, the 
Advocate General expressly mentioned the two legal bases, Articles 6 and 8 ECHR, on 
which the lawyers’ professional secrecy is based.
71
 The Court limited its analysis to the 
questions presented by the national judge.  
 
                                            
69 Séance du 28 Mars 2008—Lecture du 10 Avril 2008, D.P. III 296845, 296907 (2008), available at 
http://www.conseil-etat.fr/.  
70 Stouten & Tilleman, supra note 67, at 431.  
71 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, supra note 62, at para. 41.  
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The judgment rendered in 2012 by the ECtHR in Michaud v. France
72
 is related to the 
transposition of the 3AML Directive into the French Monetary and Financial Code. 
According to the law amending the French code, lawyers have an obligation to report 
suspicious transactions related to their clients, as envisaged by EU law. The National Bar 
Council then adopted a decision on internal procedures. A French lawyer argued before 
the Conseil d’Etat that the national law,  particularly the National Bar Council’s decision, 
violated Articles 7 and 8 of the ECHR. According to the applicant, the French law infringed 
the right to privacy typically related to a lawyer’s activities by imposing the disclosure of 
strictly confidential information. The lawyer then asked the Conseil d’Etat to refer the 
matter to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the conformity of the “declaration of 
suspicion of criminal offence” with Article 6 TEU and Article 8 of the ECHR. The Conseil 
d’Etat, however, dismissed all requests, basing its reasoning on the Ordre des barreaux 
judgment rendered by the ECJ some years before. The lawyer eventually registered an 
application with the ECtHR.  
 
1. Admissibility  
 
After carefully describing the relevant legal instruments concerning the case—including 
FATF recommendations, which appear to receive formal recognition by the European 
jurisprudence—the Strasbourg Court confirmed the admissibility of the application. France 
maintained, and the objection seems prima facie quite reasonable, that the lawyer should 
not be considered a “victim” according to Article 34 of the ECHR. It is well-known that 
individuals bringing a case to the Court must be a “victim” of a violation. In other words, “a 
person must be directly affected by the impugned measure.”
73
 Nevertheless, a person is 
victim even when “he is required to either modify his conduct or risk being prosecuted, or 
if he is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the legislation.”
74
 
In the circumstances of this case, although the lawyer was not directly affected by the 
national measure, he faced a dilemma: Either he applied the rules and thus ignored the 
principle of legal privilege, or he decided to prioritize the relation with the client and risk 
disciplinary sanctions. To that extent, the Court considered the position of the lawyer as 
the one of a “victim” under Article 34 of the Convention.  
 
2. The Application of Article 8 ECHR and the Rebuttal of the Presumption of “Equivalent 
Protection” 
 
Article 8 of the Convention was invoked because the right to respect for private and family 
life includes, applying the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the confidentiality of private 
                                            
72 Michaud v. France, 2012 VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 89. 
73 Id. at para. 51.  
74 Id.  
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communications.
75
 Accordingly, the obligation to report suspicions for the purposes of 
AML constitutes a “continuing interference” with lawyers’ right to respect of their 
correspondence. Once affirmed that the interference existed, the Court argued first that it 
was “in accordance with the law” and easily rejected the applicant’s objection on the 
vagueness of the law.
76
 Second, the Court ruled that the interference had “legitimate 
aims,” namely to combat money laundering and associated crimes.
77
 Focusing on the test 
of the necessity of the interference, the Court asked whether the presumption of 
“equivalent protection,” elaborated on by the ECtHR in Bosphorus, applied in this case.
78
 It 
goes beyond the scope of this article to offer insights into the reasoning of the Court, or 
how this judgment could be considered a further step in clarifying the not-always 
straightforward Strasbourg jurisprudence on the doctrine of equivalent protection. Thus, 
following lines will simply summarize the main paragraphs of the judgment where the 
Court decided to examine the case on its merits.  
 
Provided that a State party to the ECHR is responsible under the Convention, even in 
situations when it complies with its obligations as a member of another international 
organization, compliance with such obligations is justified: “Where the relevant 
organization protects fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees 
offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be 
considered at least equivalent—that is to say not identical but “comparable”—to that for 
which the Convention provides.” Accordingly, “the presumption will be that a state has 
not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than 
implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organization.”
79
  
                                            
75 Laura Tomasi, Articolo 8, in COMMENTARIO BREVE ALLA CONVENZIONE EUROPEA PER LA SALVAGUARDIA DEI DIRITTI 
DELL’UOMO 355 (Sergio Bartole et al. eds., 2012).  
76 See Michaud, 2012 VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 97–98 (“[S]uspicions is a matter of common sense” and “an 
informed group such as lawyers can scarcely claim that they do not understand it.”) 
77 Id. at para. 99.  
78 On the doctrine of “equivalent protection” and the Bosphorus case, see ex multis, Giorgio Gaja, The Review by 
the European Court of Human Rights of Member States’ Acts Implementing European Union Law: Solange Yet 
Again?, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT 517 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy ed., 2006); Florence Benoît-Rohmer, 
A propos de l’arrêt Bosphorus air lines du 30 juin 2005: l’adhésion contrainte de l’Union à la Convention [On the 
Judgment in Bosphorus Airlines of 30 June 2005: The EU Accession to the ECHR], 64 REV. TRIM. DR. H. 827 (2005); 
Enzo Cannizzaro, Sulla responsabilità internazionale per condotte di Stati membri dell’Unione europea: in margine 
al caso Bosphorus [On the International Responsibility for Actions Taken by EU Member States: The Bosphorus 
Case], 88 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 762 (2005); Christina Eckes, Does the European Court of Human Rights 
Provide Protection from the European Community?—The Case of Bosphorus Airways, 13 EUR. PUB. L. 47 (2007); 
Paul De Hert & Fisnik Korenica, The Doctrine of Equivalent Protection: Its Life and Legitimacy Before and After the 
European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 GERMAN L. REV. 874 (2012); Jean-
Paul Jacqué, L’arrêt Bosphorus, une jurisprudence Solange II de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme? [The 
Judgment in the Bosphorus Case: A Solange II Jurisprudence for the ECHR?], 3 RTDE 749 (2005); Kathrin Kuhnert, 
Bosphorus: Double Standards in European Human Rights Protection?, 2 UTRECHT L. REV. 177 (2006). 
79 Michaud, 2012 VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 102–03.  
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This presumption can be rebutted through two hypotheses. First, a State is fully 
responsible under the Convention where it exercises discretion in complying with its 
obligations. Second, the equivalent protection does not apply if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, “the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.”
80
  
 
Turning to Michaud, the Court confirmed that the protection of fundamental rights 
afforded by EU law is basically equivalent to the protection granted by the ECHR system, 
even though private individuals have limited access to the ECJ.
81
 The Strasbourg Court 
then considered the question of whether France had a margin of maneuver in complying 
with EU law “not without relevance.”
82
 Nonetheless, what determined the rebuttal of the 
presumption in the present case was the fact that the French Court refused to ask the ECJ 
for a preliminary ruling on the matter, and therefore limited the EU control mechanism.
83
 
As a matter of fact, in the Ordre des Barreaux judgment invoked by the Conseil d’Etat, the 
Luxembourg Court analyzed the compatibility of the obligation for lawyers only under the 
right to a fair trial, which means under the rights of the lawyer’s client. To the contrary, 
the complainant Michaud focused his application on his own rights, protected by Article 8 
ECHR. The Court thereupon decided that the presumption did not apply. The conclusion of 
the Court on the non-applicability of the presumption of equivalent protection should be 
taken into account in the current academic debate, which is not the core of this article, on 
the accession of the European Union to the ECHR, particularly the exhaustion of 
“domestic” remedies.
84
  
 
3. The Obligation for Lawyers to Report Suspicions as Proportionate Interference Under 
Article 8 ECHR 
 
The Court then turned to the question of whether the French measure amounted to a 
disproportionate interference with the legal professional privilege. It started by agreeing 
with the Conseil d’Etat, which considered the “general interest served by combating 
money-laundering” in its judgment of 23 July 2010.
85
 The Court then focused on the fact 
                                            
80 Id. at para. 103.  
81 Id. at para. 108.  
82 Id. at para. 113.  
83 Id. at para. 114.  
84 Alessandra Giannelli, L’adesione dell’Unione europea alla CEDU secondo il Trattato di Lisbona [The Accession of 
the EU to the ECHR According to the Lisbon Treaty], 14 IL DIRITTO DELL’UNIONE EUROPEA 645, 678 (2009); see 
generally, PAUL GRAGL, THE ACCESSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1st ed. 
2013).   
85 Michaud, 2012 VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 121.  
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that the right under Article 8 ECHR is not inviolable, and consequently, “Its importance 
should be weighed against that attached by the member States to combating the 
laundering of the proceeds of crime, which are likely to be used to finance criminal 
activities linked to drug trafficking, for example, or international terrorism.”
86
  
 
The judges supported this conclusion by observing that the European Directives are part of 
“a series of international instruments,” therefore stressing the need to combat money 
laundering at the international level. The Court mentions two factors in order to prove the 
proportionality of the national measures at issue. First, lawyers are subject to the 
obligation to report suspicious transactions only in specific circumstances related to the 
clients’ financial or property transactions—therefore, this obligation does not affect the 
essence of the lawyer’s defense role.
87
 Second, the Court welcomed the solution 
envisaged by the French legislation: lawyers must communicate the suspicious transaction 
to the president of the Bar or to the president of the Bar council of the Conseil d’Etat, 
without directly addressing the report to Tracfin (the French FIU).
88
 This solution 
contributes to safeguard the position of the lawyer in his/her relationship with the client. 
The European judges eventually decided by unanimity that France did not violate Article 8 
ECHR.  
 
D. AML as a “European” General Interest 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that AML policies are considered a “general 
interest” which may limit—in well-defined hypotheses—EU fundamental freedoms, such 
as the freedom to provide services, and human rights. As far as fundamental freedoms are 
concerned, this consideration should not come as a surprise. The fight against crimes may 
be invoked by States to justify domestic measures limiting the free movements of goods, 
persons, services, and capital.
89
 Interestingly, in Jyske Bank Gibraltar, the ECJ considered 
the fact that the domestic law was aimed at transposing an EU directive, which in turn 
constituted a transposition of international standards. This is a refreshingly innovative 
point. The interest in question consists in effectively fighting against money laundering on 
the European level, although the Directive must be implemented at the national level. 
Even the ECtHR, although mentioning the importance “attached by the member States to 
combating the laundering of the proceeds of crime,” referenced the fact that European 
directives are a transposition of a “series of international legal instruments.” Furthermore, 
the Strasbourg Court stressed the “threat to democracy” caused by such crimes
90
 and the 
                                            
86 Id. at para. 123.  
87 Id. at paras. 127–28.  
88Id. at para. 129.   
89 DANIELE, supra note 14, at 188.  
90 Michaud, 2012 VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 123.  
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“particular importance” of a legitimate aim—combating money laundering—in a 
“democratic society.”
91
 In this regard, the ECtHR seems to consider democracy 
synonymous with fairness in the market, which would be jeopardized by transnational 
crimes.
92
 Therefore, it is possible to argue that a “European” general interest in the fight 
against money laundering has emerged.  
 
The new 4AML Directive, adopted on 20 May 2015 according to the ordinary legislative 
procedure,
93
 can also be considered in this light.
94
 As a matter of fact, in presenting the 
proposal for the Directive in 2013, the Commission stressed that the measures enacted to 
combat transnational crimes aim to: 
 
Safeguard the interests of society from criminality and 
terrorist acts, […] safeguard the economic prosperity of 
the European Union by ensuring an efficient business 
environment, […] contribute to financial stability by 
protecting the soundness, proper functioning and 
integrity of the financial system.
95
 
  
Recital 2 of the preamble to the new Directive emphasizes the limitations of a national 
approach to the phenomenon:  
 
In order to facilitate their criminal activities, money 
launderers and financers of terrorism could try to take 
advantage of the freedom of capital movements and the 
freedom to supply financial services which the Union’s 
integrated financial area entails. Therefore, certain 
coordinating measures are necessary at Union level.  
 
                                            
91 Id. at para. 131.  
92 We will not deal with pure economic theories on markets and democracy. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1943); see also ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS, 
AND WELFARE (1976). These nonetheless do not take into account “supranational” entities such as the ones that 
have developed after the Second World War  
93 TFEU art. 289. 
94 According to the 4AML Directive, EU member states are obliged to transpose it into their national legal systems 
by 26 June 2017. Directive 2015/849, supra note 10, at art. 67.  
95 European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prevention 
of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, at 2, COM (2013) 
45 final (May 2, 2013), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52013PC0045.  
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This recital should be read together with the new recital 42, according to which “the fight 
against money-laundering and terrorist financing is recognized as an important public 
interest ground by all Member States.”
96
 Combating money laundering is a matter of 
European interest, although the specific measures must be adopted at national level. 
Furthermore, one provision clearly takes into account the jurisprudence on the reporting 
obligations for lawyers. Article 14, paragraph 4 of the new 4AML Directive provides that: 
 
Member States shall not apply the first subparagraph 
[customer due diligence requirements] to notaries, other 
independent legal professionals, auditors, external 
accountants and tax advisors only to the strict extent 
that those persons ascertain the legal position of their 
client, or perform the task of defending or representing 
that client in, or concerning, judicial proceedings, 
including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such 
proceedings.
97
 
 
The solution accepted in the definitive version of the Directive most likely does not 
address the concerns expressed by the national bar associations,
98
 but it is evidently in line 
with the position taken by EU institutions. In other words, the lawyer-client relationship 
cannot serve as a shield against obligations meant to battle money laundering.  
 
A final consideration deserves attention. The outcomes achieved in less than three 
decades since the adoption of the 1AML Directive are important, albeit not sufficient. 
First, states sometimes face multiple difficulties in aligning their legislation with the EU 
AML Directives and, accordingly, to international standards. At the European level, states 
can be judged by the ECJ in the litigation phase of an infringement procedure initiated by 
the European Commission (Article 258 TFEU). At the international level, the FATF and 
                                            
96 Directive 2015/849, supra note 10, at recital no. 42. 
97 Directive 2015/849, supra note 10, art. 14, para. 4; see also id. at art. 34, para. 2  
regarding reporting obligations, “Member States shall not apply the 
obligations laid down in Article 33(1) to notaries, other independent 
legal professionals, auditors, external accountants and tax advisors only 
to the strict extent that such exemption relates to information that 
they receive from, or obtain on, one of their clients, in the course of 
ascertaining the legal position of their client, or performing their task of 
defending or representing that client in, or concerning, judicial 
proceedings, including providing advice on instituting or avoiding such 
proceedings, whether such information is received or obtained before, 
during or after such proceedings.” 
98 Consider for example the strong position taken by the national bar associations before the ECtHR in the 
Michaud case. Michaud, 2012 IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 75.  
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Moneyval assess states’ compliance with international standards elaborated by the FATF 
(the so-called recommendations).
99
 Aware of the fact that adopting a new law does not 
mean to eliminate criminality, the FATF will assess the effectiveness of national legislation 
in the new round of mutual evaluations.
100
 Second, economic costs that financial and legal 
operators must bear in their everyday activity are too often underestimated. An 
amendment to the provisional text of the new 4AML Directive proposed by the European 
Parliament seemed to address this issue:  
 
At the same time, the objectives of protection of society 
from criminals and protection of the stability and 
integrity of the European financial system should be 
balanced against the need to create a regulatory 
environment that allows companies to grow their 
businesses without incurring disproportionate 
compliance costs. Any requirement imposed on obliged 
entities to fight money laundering and terrorist financing 
should therefore be justified and proportionate.
101
  
 
The second sentence is struck in the final version of the recital, but the objective is 
nonetheless clear. Proportionality would mean, for example, that a unique instrument at 
the domestic level should be preferred to a piece-meal approach, or that operators should 
be able to have access to information on how to concretely apply binding provisions in a 
timely manner.  
 
In sum, the fight against money laundering has permeated the European legal system and 
is considered a “general interest”, whose effects on EU fundamental freedoms, on the one 
hand, and human rights enshrined in the ECHR, on the other hand, must be carefully 
evaluated in light of the principle of proportionality. 
  
                                            
99 FATF-style regional body established within the Council of Europe.  
100 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF Recommendations 
and the Effectiveness of AML/CTF Systems, at 4–5 (2013), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013%20.pdf. 
101 European Parliament Ordinary Legislative Procedure for the Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for 
the Purpose of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Amendment 2, COD (2013) 25 (Mar. 11, 2014), 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0191+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
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